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5.1 Introduction
After Korea’s being touted as one of Asia’s economic tigers, the coun-
try’s 1997 economic collapse shocked many people. Many argued that af-
ter other Asian country crises, the massive creditor and investor flight from
the Korean currency market caused Korea’s high-debt economy to col-
lapse. However, this argument ignores both Korea’s low corporate prof-
itability over the last decade, and the fundamental causes of the financial
sector’s weakness. Following a discussion on how high debt-equity ratios
and low profitability helped cause the 1997 Korea economic crisis, I will ex-
amine their determinants, and how poor corporate governance allowed
such low profitability to occur for so long. Finally, I will discuss recent re-
forms and their preliminary results.
Advocates of the currency-flight view point to Korea’s high-debt econ-
omy over the past decade to support their argument. Compared to other
countries, Korea’s debt-equity ratio was very high. Furthermore, high debt-
equity ratios in Korea have been the norm for many years. In the currency-
flight view, although these high debt-equity ratios spurred high growth,
they also left Korean firms vulnerable to fickle creditors and investors.
When other Asian economies such as Thailand and Indonesia collapsed,
creditors and investors pulled their money out of Korean firms. The
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ensuing liquidity crisis forced many firms to default on their loans. Thus,
many firms failed, and the Korean economy collapsed.
Criticism of the above argument includes (1) the absence of high profits,
(2) the many firm failures before the collapse of other Asian economies,
and (3) the argument’s dependence on creditor and investor irrationality.
With high debt-equity ratios, Korean firms were expected to yield high
profits on their equity. However, the average rate of return on equity was
often lower than the prevailing interest rates for loans (Joh 2003), and the
return on capital had been lower than the opportunity cost. Krueger and
Yoo (2001) showed that the rate of return on assets (ROA) of the Korean
manufacturing sector has been lower than that of other countries such as
Japan, Germany, the United States, and Taiwan. So, on average, the capi-
tal used in the corporate sector was wasted on unprofitable projects.
Korea’s weak corporate governance allowed this low profitability to
continue for almost ten years before the crisis. Many firms, including six of
the thirty largest conglomerates, failed before the collapse of other Asian
economies simply because their low profits fell short of their required loan
payments (Joh 2002). The failure of many large firms severely weakened fi-
nancial institutions. Rationally concerned about their investments and
loans, foreign investors sold their Korean stocks, and foreign banks de-
manded repayment of the short-term loans given to Korean financial in-
stitutions rather than rolling them over to the following year, which had
been the usual practice. Foreign banks and investors exacerbated the cri-
sis; they did not cause it.
5.2 Crisis and Corporate-Sector Problems
High debt-equity ratios and low firm performance helped trigger fail-
ures of large chaebols even before the 1997 economic crisis. In this section,
we review the causes of the corporate-sector problems.
5.2.1 High Corporate Debt
As figure 5.1 shows, the average debt-equity ratio of Korean firms has
been very high for a long time and did not rise before the crisis. In 1997, Ko-
rean firms’ average debt-equity ratio was higher than those of other coun-
tries’ (Korea, 396 percent; United States, 154 percent; Japan, 193 percent;
Taiwan, 86 percent.1
When six of the thirty largest chaebols (business groups) went bankrupt
before the currency crisis, it triggered a cascade of nonperforming loans.
Starting with the default by Hanbo (ranked fourteenth) in January 1997
well before the Asian crisis, a series of large chaebol defaults raised suspi-
cion regarding conglomerates’ survival and the fundamental soundness of
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1. For Taiwanese firms, the figure is based on 1996 data (Bank of Korea 1997).
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the corporate sector. The total debt of these bankrupt conglomerates alone
amounted to 24.02 trillion won (see table 5.1), 35.5 percent and 5.3 percent
of the government budget and gross national product (GNP), respectively,
in 1997. Although the money for bailout would be smaller than the size of
debt, large debt of the failed chaebols in 1997 implied that bailout would
cost more than earlier bailouts. For example, during the financial crisis in
the middle of 1980s, the Bank of Korea provided six commercial banks
with 1.7 trillion won between 1985 and 1987 to rescue many debt-ridden
firms that became insolvent (see Joh 2001). Because the debt of the chaebol
became too large for the economy, and other firms were doing so poorly
that they could not easily acquire the firms with such high levels of debt, it
was extremely diﬃcult for the government to rescue the firms in trouble in
1997.
Due to their size and importance in subcontracting,2 the failure of these
chaebols had a devastating impact on the economy, leading to a series of
bankruptcies. When we consider bankruptcy of subcontractors, the im-
pact of the failure of these conglomerates would be too large for the gov-
ernment to handle. Table 5.2 shows the rapid increase in the ratio of non-
performing loans from 1997 to 1998.3
Causes of High Debt-Equity Ratio
During the early high-growth period, the government provided large
firms with capital at low interest rates. Because large firms were more likely
to receive government-subsidized capital and the government’s implicit
guarantees, firms had an incentive to increase their size by using cross-
holdings and cross-debt guarantees. Moreover, creditors were not provid-
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Table 5.1 Six Bankrupt Conglomerates among the Thirty Largest Chaebol (all defaulted
in 1997)
Hanbo Sammi Jinro KIA Haitai New-Core
Default date 23 January 19 March 21 April 15 July 1 November 4 November
Ranking 14th 25th 19th 8th 24th 28th
Debt (trillions of won) 4.42 2.43 3.23 9.57 2.52 1.85
Debt-equity ratio 648% 3,333% 4,836% 522% 669% 1,253%
Sources: Default date and ranking are from Shin and Hahm (1998). Debt size and debt-equity ratio are
from Korea Fair Trade Commission (1999).
2. Chung and Yang (1992) report that the shares of the top five and top thirty chaebol in
GNP were 9.2 percent and 16.3 percent, respectively. The Korea Economic Research Insti-
tute reports that in 1995 the shares of the top four and top thirty were 9.2 percent and 16.2
percent, respectively.
3. Many criticize that these oﬃcial numbers underestimated the true size of nonperform-
ing loans. Some estimate that nonperforming loans reached somewhere between 200 and 300
trillion won.
ing a monitoring role to failing firms. Rather, banks continued to provide
loans to failing firms. These factors helped cause high debt-equity ratios.
Government-Provided Incentives and Bailouts for Large Firms. Since the
1960s, past Korean governments have mobilized and allocated scarce cap-
ital to firms and industries (such as light-export-oriented industries and
heavy and chemical industries) based on an assessment of their contribu-
tion to the nation’s industrialization and modernization. The government
used a compliance mechanism that eﬀectively guided the behavior of ma-
jor businesses (Jones and SaKong 1980). Through nationalized banks, the
government provided targeted firms with capital at lower interest rates
than time deposit rates or inflation rates until the beginning of the 1980s.
Financial institutions simply implemented the government decisions and
made no independent decisions. Lee (1992) argued that the Korean gov-
ernment operated an internal capital market and channeled subsidized
credit to carefully targeted firms and industries.
When the government subsidized debt during the high-growth period, it
was a rational decision for firms to increase their levels of debt. As table 5.3
shows, until 1981 borrowing money from the national investment fund, or
borrowing for export, was lucrative because the borrowing interest rate was
lower than the interest rate on one-year time deposits or the inflation rate.
After 1981, interest rates on bank loans became greater than interest rates
on savings in time deposits. This was possible because the earlier Korean
government nationalized and owned the banks and regulated the interest
rates. It also practically dictated the credit allocation. This credit policy af-
feted the corporate sector: firms formed a large business group to expro-
priate cheap loans. Creditors in credit allocation decisions favored business
groups because subsidiaries could provide debt payment guarantees and the
government implicitly guaranteed them when they were in financial distress.
With subsidized debt, firms were encouraged to invest in labor-intensive
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Table 5.2 Nonperforming Loans (end of period)
December March June September December
1997 1998 1998 1998 1998
Precautionary loans 42.8 57.7 72.5 n.a n.a.
Substandard loans or below (A) 43.6 59.6 63.5 64.0 60.2
Bank 31.6 38.8 40.0 35.0 33.6
NBFI 12.0 20.8 23.5 29.0 26.6
Total loan (B) 647.4 668.7 624.8 614.3 576.5
A/B (%) 6.7 8.9 10.2 10.4 10.5
Sources: Financial Supervisory Commission (various press releases).
Notes: Precautionary loans were overdue for more than three months, and substandard loans were over-
due for more than six months. Loan classification has changed since 1999. Amounts are in trillions of
won.
exporting industries, or the heavy and chemical industry,4 in the 1960s and
1970s, respectively. The return from investment in these industries resulted
partly from lower capital costs and/or lower corporate income taxes and
the like.5 Therefore, at the individual level, each firm had an incentive to in-
vest in these industries, and may have made a rational choice of investment,
other things being equal. Consequently, investment in these industries in
the aggregate may have exceeded the socially optimal level as resources
shifted from other, more socially profitable industries.
Moreover, with huge debt, firms were vulnerable to drops in demand and
macroeconomic shocks. Each time many large firms faced financial dis-
tress, the government intervened and rescued them.6 During the debt crisis
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Table 5.3 Interest Rates, 1964–1981
Bank Loans
Year Inflation (CPI) Time Deposita General NIF Export Curb Market
1964 — 15.0 16.0 — 8.0 61.8
1965 — 30.0 26.0 — 6.5 58.9
1966 11.2 30.0 26.0 — 6.0 58.7
1967 10.9 30.0 26.0 — 6.0 56.7
1968 10.8 26.0 25.2 — 6.0 56.0
1969 12.3 24.0 24.0 — 6.0 51.4
1970 15.9 22.8 24.0 — 6.0 50.2
1971 13.5 22.0 22.0 — 6.0 46.4
1972 11.7 15.0 15.5 — 6.0 39.0
1973 3.1 12.6 15.5 — 7.0 33.2
1974 24.3 15.0 15.5 12.0 9.0 40.6
1975 25.3 15.0 15.5 12.0 9.0 47.9
1976 15.3 15.6 18.0 14.0 8.0 40.5
1977 10.1 15.8 16.0 14.0 8.0 38.1
1978 14.4 16.9 19.0 16.0 9.0 41.7
1979 18.3 14.4 19.0 16.0 9.0 42.4
1980 28.7 19.5 20.0 19.5 15.0 44.9
1981 21.3 16.2 17.0 17.5 15.0 35.3
Sources: Cho and Kim (1997; original source, Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various is-
sues).
Notes: CPI  consumer price index; NIF  National Investment Fund. Dash indicates data are not
available.
aOne-year time bank deposit.
4. These industries include power-generating equipment, cars, engines, heavy electric
equipment, telephone-switching systems, refined copper, etc.
5. Kim (1997) reports that President Park Chung Hee held monthly cabinet meetings that
decided policy measures to facilitate exports. Kim also reports that exporting firms received
credits at a lower interest rate and paid corporate income tax at 50 percent of the usual cor-
porate income tax rate.
6. See Joh (2001) for more discussion on this issue.
of 1972, the government froze their debts and gave bailout loans7 to firms
in financial distress. From 1979 to 1983, firms again suﬀered from over-
investment and depression following the second oil shock (Lee 1995). To
deal with insolvency problems associated with excessive capacity, the gov-
ernment gave financial subsidies and consolidated firms to create more
concentrated markets. In the 1980s, the government adopted some liberal
procompetition policies, privatizing commercial banks during 1981–1983,
and reducing the gap in interest rates between industrial policy loans and
general loans. During 1984–1988, many debt-ridden firms became insol-
vent, only to have the government intervene yet again.8 By providing cred-
itor banks with special 3 to 6 percent interest rate loans (the general bank
loan rate was about 12 percent; see Lee 1995), the government allowed
these banks to write oﬀ bad debts, extend debt maturities, and replace ex-
isting debt with longer-term debt at a lower rate.9 In short, the government
had repeatedly given large firms preferential subsidies and bailed them out
during times of financial distress.
Firms Inflate Size with Cross-Holdings and Cross-Debt Guarantees. Large
firms received both low-cost capital for undertaking large projects and im-
plicit guarantees from the government. Thus, firms had incentives to exag-
gerate their true size and performance. This was particularly easy for busi-
ness group firms that engaged in intragroup transactions and interlocking
ownership.10 For example, through interlocking ownership, a firm A in-
vests its assets in an aﬃliated firm B. Through double-counting of these in-
vestments, the sum of the assets of A and B can exceed the total assets of
the group.
Chaebols also can borrow more money through cross-debt payment guar-
antees. On average, a few large and better-performing firms in a chaebol
typically guaranteed 80 percent of the chaebol firms’ total debt. Moreover,
chaebols with higher debt payment guarantees managed to borrow more
money, resulting in higher debt-to-equity ratios at the group level (Lee
1998). Using debt payment guarantees, even poorly operating subsidies
managed to borrow money. The total debt payment guarantees often far
exceeded their total equity, raising doubts on their validity (see table 5.4).
Loans to Failing Firms. Banks continued lending to high debt-equity firms,
as table 5.5 shows. The largest thirty chaebols had very high debt-equity
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7. For more of the 1972 government emergency measure, see Cho and Kim (1997).
8. The government revised its tax exemption law to facilitate the insolvency procedure in
December 1985.
9. See Cho and Kim (1997). In total, acquiring firms and consolidating firms received sub-
sidies worth 7.28 trillion won (Lee 1995).
10. At least 60 percent of firms subject to external auditing report that they have legally
aﬃliated firms. See Joh (2003).
ratios (348 percent in 1995, 519 percent in 1997), some exceeding 1,000
percent. Moreover, before the crisis occurred, more than 40 percent of the
largest thirty chaebols experienced losses. For example, thirteen out of
thirty chaebols exhibited losses in 1995. Beginning in 1997, some chaebols
showed that the accumulated losses eroded their paid-in capital com-
pletely, resulting in negative equity. However, these chaebols managed to
maintain their debt levels, or borrowed more, resulting in a higher level of
debt-to-equity ratios. The continuing flow of capital to large conglomerate
firms suggests that financial institutions were not making lending deci-
sions based on monitoring chaebol finances.
5.2.2 Low Corporate Firm Performance
With high debt-equity ratios, Korean firms were expected to yield high
performance on their equity. When highly profitable firms borrow money
to exploit their investment and growth opportunities, a high debt level
might not be a serious problem. However, as figure 5.2 shows, the aver-
age rate of return on equity was often lower than the prevailing interest
rates for loans. On average, the return on capital had been lower than its
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Table 5.5 High Debt-Equity Ratios and Accounting Profitability of Thirty
Large Chaebol
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Average debt-equity ratio 347.5 386.5 519.0 369.1 306.6 218.7
Groups with debt-equity  1,000% 3 3 4 2 2 2
Groups with negative equity 0 0 2 8 5 3
Groups with loss 13 12 18 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sources: Korea Fair Trade Commission (various dates) and Choi (1996, 1997, 1998).
Notes: n.a.  not available. Chaebol with negative equity were not included in calculating the
average debt-equity ratio.
Table 5.4 Debt Payment Guarantees of the Thirty Largest Chaebol (trillions
of won)
Amount of Debt Payment Guarantee
Ratio (%)
Equity Restriction No Restriction Sum
Year (A) (B) (C) (B  C) B/A (B  C)/A
1993 3.52 12.06 4.49 16.55 342.4 469.8
1994 4.28 7.25 3.82 11.07 169.3 258.1
1995 5.07 4.83 3.38 8.21 95.2 161.9
1996 6.29 3.52 3.23 6.75 55.9 107.3
1997 7.04 3.36 3.13 6.49 47.7 92.2
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission (various dates).
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opportunity cost for almost ten years before the crisis. So, the capital was,
on average, wasted on unprofitable projects.
Moreover, the return in the stock market also shows that shareholders
on average did not receive high returns either. Shareholders received very
small dividends as firms did not make much profit, and on average they did
not make capital gains either. The monthly Korean stock price index in fig-
ure 5.3 shows large ups and downs in the return on stocks. For almost five
years after the stock market opened, the stock price index hardly changed.
Starting in the middle of the 1980s, the stock price increased fast and
reached its peak in 1989. However, in the 1990s the index was below the
peak in the 1980s, except for a few observations. In addition, after the peak
of October 1994 the average stock index already had started to decline be-
fore the economic crisis.
From these two figures, it is clear that firm performance was weak and
shareholders did not receive high returns. Why was the performance of the
corporate sector so low? There are several factors to examine. First, large,
poorly performing firms did not exit the market; and second, controlling
shareholders did not increase firm value. Rather, they diverted firm re-
sources.
To examine the causes of the low performance of Korean firms, I ana-
lyze panel data on publicly traded firms’ ownership and financial data
compiled by National Information Credit Evaluation, Inc. (NICE). Due to
ownership data availability, I examine firm data from 1993 to 1997. For the
analysis of Korean data, accounting profitability rather than stock mar-
ket–based performance is likely a better performance measure for a couple
of reasons. First, developing countries show stock market ineﬃciency, so
stock prices in Korea are not likely to reflect all available information. Sec-
ond, a firm’s accounting profitability is more directly related to its financial
survivability than stock market value is (Mossman et al. 1998). Many stud-
ies used accounting measures to predict bankruptcy (Altman 1968, Taka-
hashi, Kurokawa, and Watase 1984) or financial distress (Hoshi, Kashyap,
and Sharfstein 1991).
After excluding financial institutions and state-controlled firms from the
analysis, the data set includes 4,702 observations between 1993 and 1997.
I examine whether owners with more control rights than ownership rights
expropriated firm resources before the crisis. As Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue, a controlling shareholder has an incentive to expropriate firm
resources when his or her control rights exceed ownership rights because
his or her private benefits exceed their costs. Concentrated ownership
means less discrepancy of interests under the assumption that the control
level is very high. This assumption is likely to hold because the control
and influence of controlling shareholders is very high in Korea. Korea suf-
fers from a poor corporate governance system, as the legal institutional
environment does not protect minority shareholders and the controlling
138 Sung Wook Joh
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shareholders’ position is secured. Using ownership that is the stake of the
largest shareholder and his or her family members, the empirical result is
presented in column (1) in table 5.6. However, ownership is not a direct mea-
sure of the discrepancy between control rights and ownership rights unless
controlling shareholders’ control is more or less similar. To incorporate the
referee’s concern, I also use the diﬀerence between control rights and own-
ership rights in the analysis. I include the results in column (2) in table 5.6.
Controlling firm size, capital structure, and firm- and industry-specific
characteristics,11 I found that firms with high controlling shareholder own-
ership outperformed those with low controlling shareholder ownership, as
the first column shows. In the second column, firms with high discrepancy
between control rights and ownership rights show lower profitability. Like-
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Table 5.6 Determinants of Profitability among Publicly Traded Firms
Ordinary Income/Sales
(1) (2)
Ownership 0.0505
(9.84)
Control and ownership-rights diﬀerence –0.0205
(–3.99)
Debt ratio –0.0272 –0.0257
(–7.40) (–6.94)
Chaebol dummy –1.3473 –1.5620
(–3.52) (–3.95)
Log (asset) 0.1408 –0.3097
(0.95) (–2.16)
R&D/sales –0.0605 –0.0766
(–1.20) (–1.50)
Export/sales 0.0126 0.0120
(2.14) (2.01)
Advertisement/sales –0.0281 –0.0048
(–0.38) (–0.06)
Market share 0.0675 0.0794
(3.90) (4.56)
Industry and year dummies Included Included
No. of observations 4,702 4,702
Adjusted R2 0.3673 0.3560
Notes: The regression tests the determinants of accounting profitability based on listed firms
between 1993 and 1997. Ownership measures the controlling shareholder and his or her fam-
ily member’s ownership excluding the intragroup shareholding. Control and ownership-
rights diﬀerence is measured as the sum of all institutional and intragroup ownership minus
controlling shareholder and his or her family member’s ownership. An industry dummy is as-
signed for each five-digit Korean standard industrial classification code. The chaebol dummy
takes a value of 1 when a firm belongs to one of the largest seventy chaebol. Numbers in paren-
theses are t-values controlling for heteroskedasticity.
11. For a brief summary of how these variables aﬀect firm performance, see Martin (1993).
wise, independent firms outperformed chaebol. The results are consistent
with the argument that controlling shareholders with a large disparity be-
tween control and ownership rights pursue their own private interests at
the expense of other shareholders. For more on this, see Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976) and Joh (2003).
Cause of Low Firm Performance
The above results show that controlling shareholders have expropriated
small shareholders, lowering corporate performance. In other words, Ko-
rean firms’ low profits persisted because the corporate governance system
did not induce firm management to maximize firm value.
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate governance defines
the ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations are assured of
getting a return on their investment in a firm. By defining firm rules, incen-
tives, and goals, the management, capital suppliers, and other stakeholders
aﬀect the mechanisms by which capital and resources are allocated, profits
are distributed, and performance is monitored. In a corporate governance
system that operates for the benefit of all shareholders,12 management pur-
sues maximization of firm value.
This section examines the factors that contribute to poor corporate gov-
ernance systems. In particular, we examine factors including (1) no cred-
ible exit threat, (2) lack of financial-institution monitoring, (3) few legal
rights or types of protection for minority shareholders, (4) a negligent
board of directors, and (5) inadequate financial information.
No Credible Exit Threat. Ideally, the market continuously revolutionizes
from within, incessantly destroying the old firms and creating new ones,
according to Schumpeter (1952). As weak firms fail, new, strong firms will
replace them and employ people who lost jobs. Resources are released and
shifted from the dying factories and firms to entering producers. In Korea,
this “creative destruction” process was so weak for large firms that re-
sources were not eﬃciently allocated.
Using the annual census data, Joh (2000) showed that the Korean man-
ufacturing sector has high turnover (see table 5.7). The annual output by
new and dying plants over total economy output was high, 4.1 percent and
5.4 percent, respectively. Between 1990 and 1998, the output ratios of en-
tering and exiting plants, including switching plants, exceed 12.0 percent
and 16.9 percent of total output, respectively. The entering and exiting
plants over total plants were even higher, reaching 14.4 percent and 17.7
percent, respectively. When switching plants were included, the ratio
jumped to 24 percent and 32 percent. These turnover rates are higher than
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12. With financial market liberalization and globalization, shareholders’ interests become
most important.
those in most countries. The exit rates measured by percentage of produc-
ers for the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada are
7.0 percent, 11.5 percent, 4.6 percent, and 4.8 percent, respectively (Joh
2000).
However, turnover rate varies depending on the plant size. For larger
plants, turnover is much lower. While small plants exit the market when
they fail, large plants often do not. Table 5.8 summarizes the eﬀects of size
on turnover. Panel A shows the eﬀect of number of employees, panel B
shows eﬀects of asset size, and panel C shows the eﬀects of capital equip-
ment ratio on turnover. All panels show very similar results. Birth and
death rates are lower in the group of plants with the most employees, great-
est assets, or greatest capital ratio. These findings imply that the exit threat
for large firms was not as eﬀective as that for small plants. Without a cred-
ible threat to firm survival, managers of large firms had less incentive to
improve firm performance. In addition, large, failing firms continued to
operate, taking away resources from profitable firms.
Large firms faced a weak exit threat for three reasons. The first of these
was lengthy bankruptcy proceedings. There were three formal bankruptcy
procedures: liquidation, composition, and corporate reorganization (sim-
ilar to Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code). However, these formal in-
solvency procedures for large firms were rarely used in Korea until 1997.
Lengthy proceedings, often lasting several years, invited strategic and op-
portunistic debtor behavior, thus reducing the attractiveness of bank-
ruptcy alternatives for creditors (see table 5.7). Although more than 17,000
cases of insolvency were reported in 1997, only 490 were filed before the
court. Of these, only thirty-eight liquidations were filed (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 1998). Moreover, the
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Table 5.7 Output by Plants with Diﬀerent Turnover Status, 1990–1998 (%)
Continuing Plants New Plants Switch-Ins Dying Plants Switch-Outs
1990 3.7 18.8
1991 69.3 4.3 11.7 4.4 10.3
1992 70.2 3.8 5 7.4 13.6
1993 70.9 6.4 9.5 4.9 8.3
1994 75.5 3.1 5.1 5.7 10.6
1995 74.7 4.0 6.9 5.5 8.9
1996 74.0 3.8 6.1 5.1 11
1997 71.9 3.7 7.4 6.2 10.8
1998 3.9 11.4 n.a. n.a.
Mean 72.4 4.1 7.9 5.4 11.5
Source: Joh (2000).
Notes: n.a.  not applicable. The mean is a simple average over time.
law allowed firms that owed less than 250 billion won to use a settlement
procedure in which the court played a rather minor role while the debtor
retained possession of its estate. Composition oﬀered few guarantees to
creditors, and 65.7 percent of insolvent firms (322 out of 490 cases) applied
for this settlement procedure. The remaining firms applied for corporate
reorganization, but their financial conditions often had deteriorated too
far to restructure successfully. Koo (1998) showed that the average debt-
equity ratio of these firms was 1,200 percent. See table 5.9 for a summary
of the number of cases and duration of the proceedings.
The second cause of the weak exit threat companies faced was the
underdeveloped corporate control market. Government regulations on merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&As) and ownership structure also weakened the
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Table 5.8 Output Ratios by Plant Turnover Status When Size is Measured through
Employees, Assets, and Capital Equipment, 1990–1998 (%)
Continuing New Plants Switch-Ins Dying Plants Switch-Outs
A. Number of Employees
Top 20% 76.9 2.5 7.3 3.3 10.0
20–40% 73.0 5.2 6.7 6.8 8.3
40–60% 67.3 8.3 7.0 8.9 8.5
60–80% 57.5 11.5 8.2 12.6 10.2
80–100% 45.8 17.2 8.2 20.0 8.8
B. Asset Size
Top 20% 77.1 2.6 7.3 3.2 9.8
20–40% 72.6 4.8 6.8 6.6 9.2
40–60% 69.2 6.8 6.7 8.8 8.5
60–80% 56.8 10.8 8.7 13.3 10.4
80–100% 46.2 17.9 7.5 18.8 9.6
C. Capital Equipment Ratio
Top 20% 76.8 3.1 7.5 3.2 9.4
20–40% 74.6 3.6 7.2 5.0 9.6
40–60% 75.0 3.5 6.5 5.5 9.5
60–80% 70.5 5.0 6.5 7.8 10.2
80–100% 54.5 11.5 8.6 13.3 12.2
Source: Joh (2000).
Table 5.9 Number of Cases and Duration of Bankruptcy Proceedings (1993–1995)
Number of Years
3 4–5 6–7 8–10 11–15 16–20 Total
Successful turnaround, conclusion 1 1 2 6 7 1 18
Failure, termination 17 12 10 8 5 0 52
Source: Court Administration Agency, recited from Koo (1998).
exit mechanism. Until recently, hostile mergers and acquisitions were not
allowed, and even friendly M&As were limited to small firms.13 Any M&A
by foreigners involving over two trillion won in assets required government
approval. The mandatory-tender-oﬀer system required investors who
bought over 25 percent of a firm’s shares to publicly purchase over 50 per-
cent of the shares. In addition, the ownership structure of chaebol, with
large interlocking ownership by aﬃliated firms as shown in table 5.10, ob-
structed takeovers by outside investors. Controlling shareholders with less
than 10 percent direct ownership have control through interlocking own-
ership by other firms in the same chaebol group. Therefore, corporate
raiders needed to buy the sum of the incumbent controlling owners’ shares,
the interlocking firms’ shares, and one more share.
Finally, government support for weak, large firms was an additional cause
of the weak exit threat. Before the crisis, large firms hardly faced any exit
threats because of the government’s implicit guarantee.14 As discussed ear-
lier, the government had repeatedly rescued many failing chaebol. Because
of the debt payment guarantees, poorly performing subsidiaries can cause
financial distress for high-performing subsidiaries. So the failure of a few
subsidiaries in a large conglomerate can cause a chain reaction of failures
and devastate the economy. Partially due to its impacts on employment
and on the overall economy, the government arranged for some banks to
lend more money to these failing firms. This government behavior led to
the belief that chaebols were “too big to fail.”
Lack of Financial-Institution Monitoring. Financial institutions as credi-
tors should monitor their borrowing firms to insure their lending. How-
ever, financial institutions in Korea have not provided adequate monitor-
ing, even though Korean firms rely heavily on debt for their financing.
There are at least two reasons. Although once-nationalized commercial
banks were privatized in the 1980s, the legacy of government control re-
mained through interest rate regulation, credit policies, and government-
appointed top executives. As a result, banks did not develop suitable credit
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13. In May 1998, six months after the 1997 crisis, the Korean government removed all re-
strictions on M&A activities.
14. Kukjae’s failure in 1984 was a politically motivated exception.
Table 5.10 In-Group Ownership Trends of the Thirty Largest Chaebol (%)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
30 largest chaebol 31.5 31.7 33.0 33.5 33.1 33.0 32.8 33.8 34.5
5 largest chaebol 35.7 36.3 38.4 38.6 37.2 35.0 n.a. n.a. 36.6
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission (1999).
Note: n.a.  not available.
evaluation and risk management techniques to make informed loan deci-
sions. Banks did not have an incentive to monitor or discipline managers.
Often, they gave loans to large firms with implicit government guarantees
or cross-debt guarantees, as discussed earlier. Moreover, the linkage be-
tween chaebols and financial institutions exacerbated the problems. Ac-
cording to Kim (1999), chaebol with nonbank financial institutions show a
high debt-equity ratio while those chaebol-controlled financial institutions
show a lower ROA. These results suggest that chaebols were transferring
resources from financial institutions to poorly performing industrial firms.
Few Legal Rights or Types of Protection for Minority Shareholders. As eq-
uity holders, shareholders have incentives to induce firm management to
pursue value maximization. However, eﬀective monitoring activity is un-
derprovided, as it has public-good properties. While a monitoring share-
holder pays all costs, he or she cannot monopolize the benefit of monitor-
ing but shares it with other shareholders. When a shareholder overcame
free-rider problems associated with the public-good property of monitor-
ing, the shareholder was likely to face diﬃculty in actively engaging in
monitoring because most shareholder rights required a minimum 5 per-
cent ownership that few shareholders had. Shareholders needed at least 5
percent ownership to do any of the following: remove a director, file an in-
junction, file a derivative suit, demand a convocation, inspect accounting
books, inspect corporate aﬀairs and company property, or request a re-
moval of liquidation receiver. Over 97 percent of shareholders lacked these
rights as they were small investors with less than 1 percent ownership. Even
when small shareholders do not have certain rights, minority shareholders
as a group could be better protected when class action suits are introduced
and fiduciary duty is imposed on directors and managers.15 However, nei-
ther class action suits nor fiduciary duty was introduced. Therefore, mi-
nority shareholders had few legal rights or types of protection. So they had
diﬃculty preventing controlling shareholders and firm managers from
pursuing wasteful projects.
Negligent Board of Directors. Without a significant exit threat and little
financial-institution monitoring, internal monitoring and discipline be-
come more important. The board of directors should monitor and dis-
cipline managers, thereby mitigating the opportunistic behavior of
controlling shareholders. However, boards of directors did not. We have
indirect evidence that boards did not represent all the shareholders’ inter-
ests, and did not monitor controlling shareholders. Before the crisis oc-
curred, over 75 percent of firms polled said that they rarely or never con-
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15. See Johnson et al. (2000) for more discussion on fiduciary duty and duty of care for
managers and directors.
sidered the minority shareholders’ opinion in selecting directors and au-
ditors (Jun and Kong 1995). Because board members were elected through
separate majority votes, controlling shareholders were able to elect all di-
rectors they recommended. On average, the controlling shareholders could
control more than 40 percent of shares in the largest thirty chaebols as they
controlled not only their family ownership but also in-group ownership, as
shown in table 5.10. Therefore, the controlling shareholders were able to se-
lect all directors and, hence, have all the control (see table 5.11).
Moreover, once directors and auditors were elected, they did not have to
represent the firm value or shareholder groups’ interest. The legal respon-
sibilities of directors are based on the principle of duty of care.16 Under this
principle, directors are given the benefit of the doubt when conflicts of in-
terest are in question. Otherwise, their willfulness or negligence is to be
proved legally. Consequently, board members were accountable only to the
controlling shareholders, as small shareholders with less than 5 percent of
ownership could not remove them. The extremely high agenda approval
rate of outside directors after the crisis (see table 5.12) implies that direc-
tors did not hinder controlling shareholders from pursuing private bene-
fits.
Inadequate Financial Information. Inadequate financial information hin-
ders management evaluation, thereby obstructing rewards for good man-
agers and removal of poor managers. The market lacked accurate and reli-
able information on firm performance and management due to low
accounting standards, lack of transparency, and government-triggered in-
centives for firms to exaggerate their size. Accounting standards in Korea
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Table 5.11 Frequency of Considering Minority Shareholder Opinion in Selecting
Directors and Auditors (%)
Type of Firm Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never
Owner-manager 6.2 6.2 12.5 31.3 43.8
Hired manager 2.9 5.7 14.3 40.0 37.1
Source: Jun and Gong (1995).
16. See n. 15.
Table 5.12 Outside Directors’ Attendance and Approval Rates (%)
Agenda Approval Board Attendance Other Involvement
99.3 66.0 6.2
Source: Jang (2000).
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Table 5.13 Review of Auditing Firms’ Financial Statements, 1998–2000
Firms (A) Improper Auditing (B) Ratio (B/A)
Regular auditing (listed firms) 97 29 29.9%
Irregular/frequent auditing 6 3 50%
Special auditing 48 46 96%
Consigned auditing 118 116 98%
Total 269 194 72%
Source: Financial Supervisory Service (2000).
Table 5.14 Large Chaebol under Insolvency Procedures, As of August 1999
Daewoo Donga Halla Kohap Jinro Anam Haitai Kangwon Shinho
Type w/o w/o r/o w/o c/o w/o c/o w/o w/o
Rank in 1996 2 11 17 18 22 23 24 26 29
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy (1999).
Notes: w/o = workout; r/o = reorganization; c/o = composition.
did not meet accepted international standards, so poor auditing hindered
eﬀorts to monitor and evaluate firm performance. For example, when firm
A guarantees debt payment to firm B, A need not report such action accu-
rately, thereby hiding A’s higher risk. Furthermore, with easy access to debt
financing, chaebols need not attract and retain equity investors through fi-
nancial transparency. Indeed, withholding information from other share-
holders facilitates firm control by the dominant shareholder.
It is diﬃcult to measure how opaque the financial statements were before
the crisis. However, recent auditing of financial statements by the Finan-
cial Supervisory Service reveals many flaws. On average, the review found
that 72 percent of audits had flaws. Improper auditing ranges from minor
errors to fraud. So firm financial statements in earlier years facing less
scrutiny were likely more flawed and misleading (see table 5.13).
5.3 Eﬀects of Recent Corporate Governance Reforms
5.3.1 Major Changes
Since the crisis occurred, several measures have been introduced to im-
prove the corporate governance system, including more credible exit
threats for large firms, strengthened minority shareholders’ rights, man-
dated outside directors, and increased roles for boards of directors.
Many large conglomerates, including Daewoo, which was ranked sec-
ond in 1999, have fallen to insolvency procedures (see table 5.14). Al-
though the government continues to try to rescue some chaebols (e.g.,
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Table 5.15 M&A Trends before and after the Crisis
Total Cases by Amount by Foreigners
Cases Foreigners ($ billions)
1997 418 19 0.84
1999 557 168 8.80
Change 139 149 7.86
(33.2%) (784%) (935%)
Source: Korea Fair Trade Commission (1998, 2000).
Table 5.16 Key Items of Minority Shareholders’ Rights (%)
Former Securities and
Commercial Code Amendments Exchange Act
Requesting removal of a director 5 3 0.5
(0.25)
Right to injunction 5 1 0.5
(0.25)
Derivative suit 5 1 0.01
Shareholder’s proposal n.a. 3 1
(0.5)
Demand for convocation 5 3 3
(1.5)
Inspect account books 5 3 1
(0.5)
Inspect aﬀairs and property 5 3 3
(1.5)
Request a new liquidation receiver 5 3 0.5
(0.25)
Source: Joh (2001; original source, Ministry of Finance and Economy).
Notes: n.a.  not applicable. Appraisal rights of general shareholders’ meeting convocation
and shareholder proposals estimated on the basis of voting stocks. Numbers in parentheses
show cases of corporations with more than 100 billion won in paid-in capital at the end of the
most recent business year.
Hyundai), these failures signal a new government policy of noninterven-
tion in the corporate sector. So many failing chaebols were losing so much
money that the government may have lacked the funds to save them from
bankruptcy.
In addition, all M&As, including hostile takeovers and foreign takeovers,
have been legalized. Compared to 1997, the number and amount of M&As,
especially by foreign firms, had skyrocketed in 1999 (see table 5.15). In
short, large, failing firms face more credible exit threats than before.
The government has lowered the minimum shareholding requirements
for many shareholder rights (see table 5.16). Now any shareholder with
0.01 percent of firm ownership can file a derivative suit. Despite such
changes, monitoring by individual small shareholders remains unlikely,
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Table 5.17 Selection of Outside Directors
Recommending Party
Controlling Shareholder Main Creditor Employee Others
Ratio 343 25 20 77
(73.8%) (5.3%) (4.3%) (16.6%)
Source: Jang (2000).
Table 5.18 Directors’ Attendance Rate Classified by Agenda Category (%)
Immediate Public One-Day Transactions with
Disclosure Disclosure Controlling Shareholders Others
61.4 52.7 36.6 47.5
Source: Jang (2000).
mostly due to the free-rider problems associated with the public-good prop-
erty of monitoring.
Now, after the crisis, outside directors are mandated, and their role has
been strengthened. But the situation has not changed much. In 1999, more
than 73 percent of board members selected were recommended by the con-
trolling shareholders (see table 5.17). Moreover, the overall activity of di-
rectors is disappointing. As discussed earlier, their agenda approval rate is
very high, exceeding 99 percent. Further, when the boards have to approve
transactions involving controlling shareholders, the attendance rate is very
low (see table 5.18). In short, the oversight role of boards of directors is still
limited.
5.3.2 Eﬀects of Reform
It is too early to evaluate the full eﬀects of corporate governance reforms
on the corporate sector. Nevertheless, some of the early results imply
changes in the corporate sector. Joh (2002) argues that the corporate sec-
tor shows improved profitability in 1999 and 2000 compared with the pre-
crisis periods. In particular, surviving chaebols show higher profitability.
Chiu and Joh (2003) try to evaluate how the crisis and corporate reform
aﬀect the structure of chaebols. They argue that a firm’s rate of return de-
pends on market risk, firm idiosyncratic risk, and group risk. Through an
internal capital market, chaebol structure enables firms to transfer idio-
syncratic risks to other firms and exposes them to other firms’ risks as well.
Facing transferred risk and common group risk, chaebol-aﬃliated firms
show synchronicity in their stock market rates of return. Using the daily
stock market data between 1996 and 2001, Chiu and Joh measure the
strength of business group structure through risk transfer and synchronic-
ity. The risk transfer of small chaebols has increased compared to the pre-
crisis period. However, the risk transfer of large chaebols has decreased be-
low the precrisis level during the crisis and post-Daewoo-collapse periods
(Daewoo was second-largest chaebol in 1999). While the level of synchro-
nicity remains above the precrisis level, the synchronicity of large chaebols
decreased below the precrisis level. Using firm-level panel data, they show
that the eﬀect of group risk is high during the crisis and reform periods.
But it becomes smaller than its precrisis level for large chaebols during the
post-Daewoo-collapse period.
Joh and Ryoo (2000) examined the extent of a controlling shareholder’s
private gains. Since they are diﬃcult to detect, the proportional voting
rights premium (PVRP) is used. PVRP is the diﬀerence in common stock
price and preferred stock price divided by the preferred stock price. Com-
mon stocks have voting rights and lower dividends. In contrast, preferred
stocks have no voting rights but receive higher dividends. Thus, the pre-
mium increases during corporate-control contests over a firm (e.g.,
M&As) when control rights are sought, or when a shareholder can reap
private gains through control-ownership disparity. Otherwise, the PVRP
will be smaller. For example, average PVRPs in the United States, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom are 5.3 percent, 6.5 percent, and 13.3 percent, re-
spectively.
In contrast, the PVRP in Korea has been very large with wide fluctua-
tions. The average PVRP was around 95 percent of a common share in
1996. Because takeover threats were almost nonexistent due to legal con-
straints, the premium before the crisis mostly represents private benefits.
The average PVRP in 1999 after restructuring was lower than in 1996, but
still around 81 percent. In contrast, this result suggests that investors be-
lieve controlling shareholders’ private gains are still high, but smaller than
before the crisis.
5.4 Conclusion
High debt-equity ratios, low long-term firm profitability, and weak cor-
porate governance helped cause Korea’s 1997 economic crisis. High debt-
equity ratios stemmed from government policy, firms’ inflation of their
reported size, and negligent bank lending. Government industrial policy
pushed development of specific industries and gave special incentives to
large firms. Firms then inflated their apparent size through cross-holdings
and cross-debt guarantees. Moreover, government-directed banks contin-
ued lending money to low-profitability firms. As a result, many large firms
had huge debt-equity ratios.
Low firm profits were caused partially by unprofitable investment in
aﬃliated firms. Control-ownership disparity and chaebol organization cor-
related with low profitability, suggesting that controlling shareholders ex-
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ploited these unprofitable investments for private gains. Moreover, Korea’s
weak governance system allowed such low profitability to persist for nearly
ten years. Factors that contribute to the failure of corporate governance
include the following: (1) no credible exit threat, (2) lack of financial-
institution monitoring, (3) few legal rights or types of protection for mi-
nority shareholders, (4) negligent boards of directors, and (5) inadequate
financial information.
After maintaining high debts and low profitability for a long time, the
Korean corporate sector experienced massive failures in 1997. Partially
prompted by changes in government policies regarding the corporate gov-
ernance system, including allowing many of the largest chaebols to fail, the
corporate sector has been under pressure to change its structure and goals
from size maximization to value maximization.
References
Altman, Edward. 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis, and the prediction
of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 4:589–609.
Bank of Korea. 1997. Financial statement analysis. Seoul: Bank of Korea.
———. Various issues. Economic statistics yearbook. Seoul: Bank of Korea.
———. Various years. Financial statement analysis. Seoul: Bank of Korea.
Chiu, Ming Ming, and Sung Wook Joh. 2003. The eﬀects of the economic crisis and
corporate reform on business groups: Evidence from Korea. Paper presented at
the third Asian Corporate Governance Conference. May, Seoul.
Cho, Yoon Je, and Joon Kyung Kim. 1997. Credit policies and the industrialization
of Korea: Lessons and strategies. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.
Choi, Sung Noh. 1996, 1997, 1998. The largest thirty chaebols in Korea. Seoul: Free
Enterprise Institute.
Chung, Byong Hyou, and Young Shik Yang. 1992. Korean chaebols. Seoul: Korea
Development Institute.
Financial Supervisory Service. 2000. Press release on the review of auditing firms’
financial statements, 1998–2000. Seoul: Financial Supervisory Service.
———. Various issues. Press release on nonperforming loans. Seoul: Financial Su-
pervisory Service.
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein. 1991. Corporate structure,
liquidity, and investment: Evidence from Japanese industrial groups. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106:33–60.
Jang, Ha Sung. 2000. A study on the eﬀects of the post-crisis corporate reform. Ko-
rea University. Mimeograph.
Jensen, Michael, and William Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial be-
havior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics
3:305–360.
Joh, Sung Wook. 2000. Micro-dynamics of industrial competition: Evidence from
Korean manufacturing plants. KDI Policy Study no. 2000-5. Seoul: Korea De-
velopment Institute.
———. 2001. The Korean corporate sector: Crisis and reform. In Korea’s economic
The Korean Economic Crisis and Corporate Governance System 151
prospects: From financial crisis to prosperity, ed. Yul Kwon and William Shep-
herd, 116–132. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
———. 2002. Chaebol reform and structural changes in the corporate sector. Pa-
per presented at conference, The Korean Economy: Beyond the Crisis. October,
Seoul.
———. 2003. Corporate governance and firm profitability: Evidence from Korea
before the economic crisis. Journal of Financial Economics 68:287–322.
Joh, Sung Wook, and Sang Dai Ryoo. 2000. Evaluation of changes in the corporate
governance system of Korean chaebols. Paper presented at the twelfth Pacific
Asia Free Trade and Development Conference. May, Seoul.
Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer.
2000. Tunneling. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 90:22–27.
Jones, Leroy, and Il SaKong. 1980. Government, business, and entrepreneurship in
economic development: The Korean case. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Jun, In Woo, and Byeong-Ho Gong. 1995. Corporate governance in Korea. Seoul:
Korea Economic Research Institute.
Kim, Chung-Yum. 1997. Policymaking on the front lines: Memoirs of a Korean prac-
titioner, 1945–1979. Seoul: Jung-Ang Daily Press.
Kim, Joon Kyung. 1999. Chaebols’ ownership of NBFIs and related problems. KDI
Economic Outlook 1 (4): 83–94.
Koo, Bonchun. 1998. Reform measures for Korean bankruptcy reorganization and
composition. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.
Korea Fair Trade Commission. 1998, 2000. White book for Fair Trade Commission.
Seoul: Korea Fair Trade Commission.
———. 1999. Press release on the thirty largest chaebols’ ownership structure.
Seoul: Korea Fair Trade Commission, April.
———. Various dates. Press releases on equity investment and debt payment guar-
antees of the thirty largest chaebol. Seoul: Korea Fair Trade Commission.
Krueger, Anne, and Jungho Yoo. 2001. Falling profitability, higher borrowing
costs, and chaebol finances during the Korean crisis. Paper presented at the Con-
ference on the Korean Crisis and Recovery. 17–19 May, Seoul.
Lee, Byong Ki. 1998. Debt payment guarantees of Korean chaebols. Seoul: Korea
Economic Research Institute.
Lee, Chung H. 1992. The government, financial system, and large private enter-
prises in the economic development of South Korea. World Development 20:187–
197.
Lee, Soon Woo. 1995. Reorganization of failing firms. Seoul: Jilritamgoo.
Martin, Stephen. 1993. Advanced industrial economics. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell.
Ministry of Finance and Economy. 1999. Press release on corporate restructuring.
Seoul: Ministry of Finance and Economy.
Mossman, Charles, Geoﬀrey Bell, Mick Swartz, and Harry Turtle. 1998. An em-
pirical comparison of bankruptcy models. Financial Review 33:35–54.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1998. OECD
economic surveys. Paris: OECD.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1952. History of economic analysis. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Shin, Inseok, and Joon-Ho Hahm. 1998. The Korean crisis: Causes and resolution.
KDI Working Paper no. 9805. Seoul: Korea Development Institute.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Jour-
nal of Finance 52:737–783.
Takahashi, Kichinosuke, Yukiharu Kurokawa, and Kazunori Watase. 1984. Corpo-
rate bankruptcy prediction in Japan. Journal of Banking and Finance 8:229–247.
152 Sung Wook Joh
Comment Mario B. Lamberte
Up until the East Asian financial crisis, many observers had admired the
rapid growth of the Korean economy. Of course, there were those who
doubted the sustainability of Korea’s economic growth by comparing its
industrial strategy, which relied so much on the chaebols, with that of Tai-
wan’s, which nurtured small and medium enterprises. The criticisms were
somewhat muted by Korea’s hosting of the summer Olympics and admis-
sion to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In
the 1990s, Korea’s exports and foreign direct investment to its neighboring
countries started to compete with those of Japan’s. Korea also started to
behave itself like a donor country, at least for Asian countries.
The Korean economy’s sterling performance in the last two decades
prior to the regional crisis had convinced many that the Korean economic
model works and can be applied to their countries. In the Philippines, for
example, many (including policymakers) believe that the best way for the
country to grow rapidly is to choose a few winning industries, limit the
number of large players within each industry, and pour all the necessary
government support into those industries. The Philippine president ought
to emulate what President Park Chung Hee did to boost exports. Interest-
ingly, the Korean economy’s quick recovery from the crisis seemed to have
strengthened Philippine resolve to adopt the Korean model. This only goes
to show how observers and policymakers in the region have regarded Ko-
rea’s successful economic model. Indeed, Joh’s present paper and her ear-
lier works referred to in that paper are important reading materials for all
because they shed light on why the formidable Korean economy collapsed
during the East Asian financial crisis.
Joh’s main thesis is that the Korean economy’s collapse was actually an
accident waiting to happen long before the regional financial crisis. The
Korean corporate sector, which had been dominated by chaebols, carried
very high debt-equity ratios for almost three decades, dwarfing those that
can be observed in developed economies. Contrary to expectations, firms’
rates of return on equity had been dismally low, and this persisted for a
long time. This has made the Korean economy very fragile. A collapse of a
few chaebols that had made large contributions to the domestic economy
created a ripple eﬀect, causing similarly situated firms to default, and ulti-
mately sending the economy into a tailspin.
Joh’s explanations of the causes of the high debt-equity ratios and low
performance of the corporate sector certainly deserve greater attention, es-
pecially since she backs them up with hard data. She attributes the persist-
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ence of high debt-equity ratios to the government’s generous incentives
and bailout arrangements for large, failing firms; banks’ continued lending
to highly indebted, poorly performing firms; and very lax rules on firms’
cross-holdings and cross-debt guarantees. Controlling shareholders
caused the low profitability of firms, which had been sustained because of
weak corporate governance, inadequate financial information of firms,
failure of banks to act as eﬀective monitors of corporate governance, weak
protection systems for minority shareholders, and negligent boards of di-
rectors. She has noted some of the recent measures adopted by the Korean
government to improve corporate governance, such as instituting more
credible exit threats for large firms, mandating outside directors, and in-
creasing roles for boards of directors. It is still too early to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of these measures, but the initial results seem to have been
mixed.
As the author noted, the recent crisis is not the first time that the Korean
corporate sector encountered a crisis in the last thirty years. There were in
fact several crises in the 1970s and the 1980s. Perhaps, the author can elab-
orate more on what makes the recent crisis diﬀerent from the previous
ones. Is it the extent of participation of foreign investors and lenders, who
fled in droves when they saw their interests about to be eroded by the im-
pending crisis? Is it because the same crisis occurred at a time when the po-
litical and economic environment could no longer accommodate the solu-
tions used in the past in dealing with similar crises? Or is it the sheer size of
the cost of bailing out ailing corporations? It would certainly help if there
were information on the costs incurred by the government in bailing out
failed corporations in the 1970s and 1980s. The Philippines encountered a
severe economic crisis in the mid-1980s. The magnitude of the costs ab-
sorbed by the government in cleaning up nonperforming assets of private
and government-owned corporations that lent to failed “crony” firms
made the public sensitive to any discussion about bailing out another cor-
poration. I wonder if the ailing corporations in the 1970s and 1980s that
received substantial assistance from the Korean government in various
forms are the same corporations that faced financial distress during the
East Asian financial crisis.
One of the things that puzzled me (which, by the way, was partly ex-
plained by the author) was the persistently low rate of return on equity de-
spite the high debt-equity ratios of firms. Why would both majority and mi-
nority shareholders continue to keep their money in these corporations
when “the return on capital had been lower than its opportunity cost”? I
am not too familiar with the Korean capital market, but I wonder if the
prevailing interest rate on loans has been generally accepted as the indica-
tor of the cost of capital in the country.
Developing countries in the region are keenly watching the progress of
Korea’s eﬀorts in reforming corporate governance because of the impor-
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tant lessons it brings to them. The trends in mergers and acquisitions are
particularly interesting, especially after hostile takeovers and foreign take-
overs have been legalized in Korea. However, this is only one part of the
story. The other part of the story is whether the corporate sector, in general,
and the newly merged or acquired corporations, in particular, have insti-
tuted measures to improve corporate governance.
The reforms instituted by Korea in enhancing the rights and protection
of minority shareholders are indeed commendable. However, as the author
noted, “[d]espite such changes, monitoring by individual small sharehold-
ers remains unlikely, mostly due to the free-rider problems associated with
the public-good property of monitoring.” This is one of the instances in
which outside directors can be counted upon. However, the performance
of outside directors has so far been generally disappointing. This raises two
issues. One pertains to the rules in selecting outside directors. Having out-
side directors would be rendered futile if controlling shareholders had the
unquestioned authority to select them. Even if their role was strengthened,
outside directors would still feel beholden to the controlling shareholders.
The other issue is the limited market of outside directors in developing
economies. I wonder if, in the case of Korea, the corporation code allows
foreigners to sit as outside directors, at least in big corporations, to make
up for the lack of such capacity at home. I would hasten to add, however,
that the monitoring system being developed in Korea to assess perfor-
mance of outside directors is something that could be emulated by other
countries in the region that have mandated the inclusion of outside direc-
tors.
Finally, I would like to raise two minor points. One is that it would
greatly help the reader to interpret table 5.5 if the author explained how
the variable “ownership” is measured and whether the variable “chaebol
dummy” refers to the holding companies or to all of the 552 corporations
identified as belonging to chaebols. The other is that the author should
have briefly discussed the method used in estimating the parameters of the
same table.
Comment Philip L. Williams
The Paper
Economists, as a profession, are notoriously cynical. We tend to analyze
the behavior of individuals and groups by attributing to them the basest of
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motives. Our analysis repeats, with interest, the Christian doctrine of orig-
inal sin.
The cynicism of the economist is perhaps most pronounced among
those of us who devote our professional careers to the analysis of public
policy; and this cynicism is constant across time and space. For the past
three centuries and across all continents, economists have expressed this
cynicism (with very little adaptation to allow for diﬀerences in institutions
or culture).
This paper, by Sung Wook Joh, is very much in this tradition of extreme
cynicism toward government policy. It presents a picture of government
policy prior to the currency crisis that is truly alarming. The crisis in Ko-
rea is shown to be far more fundamental than a flight of capital caused by
foreign providers of funds. Rather, the large Korean conglomerates (the
chaebols) were starting to fail some years prior to the currency crisis, but
the weakness of these conglomerates was hidden for many years by the
government’s pressuring the banks to keep lending.
The paper ends on a note of cautious optimism. Recent reforms (allow-
ing conglomerates to fail, legalizing mergers and acquisitions, increasing
rights to small shareholders) are worthwhile improvements in corporate
governance; but, as always, more remains to be done.
Although the matters rehearsed in the preceding section are the themes
of the paper, its chief contribution lies in its detailed empirical analysis.
This gives rise to two reflections.
The Korean Enterprise
The first reflection is stimulated by “Causes of Low Firm Performance,”
in section 5.2.2, and, in particular, by table 5.7. Table 5.7 suggests that (de-
spite the behavior of government in ensuring the conglomerates get their
share of soft loans), Korea has a high rate of turnover of plants. The paper
comments that this rate of turnover is much higher for smaller plants than
for larger plants.
These observations immediately raise the question of how to map from
data relating to plants to data relating to enterprises and, indeed, whether
Korean data relating to enterprises are available. Indeed, there is a prior,
and much more intractable, issue: where to draw the boundaries to an en-
terprise if separate legal entities are linked together by intragroup transac-
tions, cross-ownership of shares, common directors, and cross-guarantees
of debt.
Rate of Return on Shareholders’ Funds
My second reflection is stimulated by a number of observations in the
paper about rates of return on equity compared with rates of return on
debt. The paper states (section 5.1 and section 5.2.2) that high debt-equity
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ratios would lead one to expect high rates of return on equity. This makes
good intuitive sense: If one is providing equity funds, the more dollars of
debt that are standing ahead of me in the queue, the higher is the risk to me
if the corporation is in trouble and so the higher will be my average return
ex post.
But the paper presents evidence that seems to contradict this story:
the data presented show that the average rate of return on equity has
frequently been below the prevailing rate of interest. This is an obvious
puzzle: If a saver has a dollar, why would he or she transfer this to a corpo-
ration in the form of equity (lower returns and higher risk) when it could
be transferred in the form of debt?
I shall address my remarks to the rate of return on funds, not to the rate
of return on sales, which is the dependent variable in the regression re-
ported in table 5.6. I think, subject to what I am about to say, that the regres-
sion could be made more relevant to the argument of the paper by re-run-
ning it with the dependent variable as the rate of return on shareholders’
funds.
My observations are these. In the first place, one must question the data
of the rates of return on shareholders’ funds. The paper tells of alarming
problems with the recording of assets and liabilities in the balance sheets of
the various legal entities that make up each chaebol. For example, we are
told (in “Causes of Low Firm Performance”) that if firm A invests in aﬃli-
ated firm B, there may be double-counting of the investments so that the
sum of the assets of A and B can exceed the total assets of the group. Sim-
ilarly, we are told (in “Inadequate Financial Information”) that debt pay-
ment guarantees by a larger corporation to a smaller corporation within a
chaebol can increase the amount of aggregate borrowing because the guar-
antee is not recorded as a liability in the balance sheet of the larger corpo-
ration. These problems suggest that any numbers based on accounting data
are likely to be extremely suspect.
The second observation that should be made about the comparison of
rates of return on equity compared with debt is that, even if the figures in
the company accounts can be used as indicative, the recorded rates of in-
terest cannot be used without adjustment because they hide the large sub-
sidies that were provided to debt finance. A recent paper (Krueger and Yoo
2001) attempts to estimate the magnitude of these subsidies.
Implications for Policy
These reflections on data impel me to question the (admittedly guarded)
optimism of the conclusions of the paper. Governance demands the gath-
ering of information and an ability to react to it. This paper argues over-
whelmingly that the information available to providers of funds to Korean
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companies is grossly distorted. The chief culprits seem to be two: (1) gov-
ernment-promoted distortions through control of the banks and (2) poor
accounting standards.
These two problems seem to be quite fundamental to the issue of corpo-
rate governance in Korea. Until they are addressed, investors will continue
to treat Korean corporations with cynicism. Indeed, the cynicism of the in-
vestors will match the cynicism of the economists.
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